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Abstract 
The paper develops a 3-sector general equilibrium model appropriate for economies with 
female labour oriented export sector to examine the effects of economic liberalization 
policies on gender based wage inequality. It is assumed that there exist disparities in 
efficiencies between male and female labour due to skewed access to education and 
health, and differences in their spending patterns leading to differential effects of 
respective wages on their nutrition. The results indicate that tariff cut may reduce gender 
wage inequality, but may have detrimental effects on welfare; while foreign capital 
inflow may accentuate the inequality, despite improving the welfare of the economy. 
However, government policies to increase the provision of education and health have 
favourable effects on gender wage inequality but may be welfare deteriorating. Thus, the 
paper provides a theoretical explanation to empirical evidences of diverse effects of 
liberalization on gender wage inequality and explains the possibility of a trade-off 
between gender inequality and social welfare. 
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Economic Liberalization, Gender Wage Inequality and Welfare – A Theoretical 
Analysis 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Gender inequality in the labour market is a pervasive phenomenon in most countries, 
especially the developing ones. One of its important manifestations is the gender wage 
gap, generally referred to the average difference in hourly earnings of men and women.  
The size of the gap varies from country to country and is dependent on many variables. In 
many countries in Asia and the Middle East and North Africa, the gap is upwards of 40 
per cent in some sectors (Corley, et al 2005). In Latin America and the Caribbean, most 
women earn on average only about 69 per cent of men’s labour income1. Even within the 
same occupations the wages and earnings of women tend to be less than those of their 
male counterparts. 
 
The gender wage inequality has been significantly impinged by the ongoing trend of 
economic liberalisation, with an increasing number of countries embracing policies like 
cutback in tariff barriers and reduction or elimination of restrictions on foreign 
investment. Trade liberalisation brings about changes in the relative prices of goods, 
while foreign capital inflow alters the relative factor endowments, leading to changes in 
relative factor prices. Both of these induce reallocation of factors of production among 
sectors that use them with different intensities and therefore changes in their employment 
and remuneration. Therefore, liberalization policies affect the choice of employment 
between male and female workers and their respective wages (UNCTAD 2009). 
 
The theoretical underpinning of the impact of trade liberalization on the gender wage gap 
is based on two mainstream theories, Heckscher-Ohlin/ Stolper-Samuelson (HO/SS) 
theory and Becker’s (1957) theory of discrimination. Both predict a beneficial impact of 
trade openness on gender wage gap. The standard trade theory suggests that trade 
                                                 
1
 UNICEF. State of the World’s Children 2007, pp. 18. Also see 
www.unicef.org/sowc07/docs/sowc07_tacro.pdf   
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liberalization in unskilled labour-abundant developing countries increases the demand for 
unskilled labour and pulls up their relative wage. Since most of the unskilled work is 
often performed by women, particularly in the export processing zones2, it can be 
inferred that globalization causes an increase in women’s wages and the diminution of 
the gender gap. On the other hand, Becker’s (1957) theory asserts that if employers 
discriminate against female workers and pay them less than male workers, then under 
increased competitive pressures due to trade openness, the demand for underpaid female 
labour is expected to grow, bidding up their wage and reducing the wage gap. 
 
Several empirical studies confirm that international trade openness have resulted in 
narrowing gender wage inequality (Berik 2000; Fontana and Wood 2000; Hazarika and 
Otero 2004; Oostendorp 2004). There also exist a plethora of evidences that document 
persistent and even increasing gender wage gaps as a consequence of liberalisation 
(Fontana 2002; Berik, Rodgers and Zveglich 2004). The issue perhaps is particularly 
interesting in the context of the South Asian countries like India, Bangladesh and 
Pakistan which have embarked on liberalization policies and are characterized by low 
paid female labour intensive export oriented sectors. Menon and Rodgers (2009) find that 
in India, policy reforms like licensing deregulation and tariff reductions have increased 
competitive forces in the manufacturing industries and weakened the bargaining power of 
women, leading to the widening of the wage gap. Chamarbagwala (2006) finds that 
international trade in manufactures have benefited skilled men but hurt skilled women, 
whereas outsourcing of services has generated a demand for both female and male 
college graduates. In Bangladesh, gender wage differentials in garments were found to 
narrow from 1983 to 1990, but increased from 1990 to 1997, mainly owing to a higher 
proportion of men taking up high skilled jobs and an increase in the number of temporary 
workers among women (Bhattacharya and Rahman 1999; Paul-Majumder and Begun 
2000). Siddiqui et al (2006) in a study of export-oriented industries in Pakistan concluded 
                                                 
2
 On average 70 percent of the labour force in EPZs is female (Joekes and Weston 1994), and in 
some countries, such as Sri Lanka, women constitute 85% of the workforce in EPZs (See United 
Nations 1999; Benería 2003).  
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that liberalization resulted in a disproportionately higher negative impact on females. 
Trade liberalization through tariff reduction and fiscal adjustment through cut in 
government expenditure reduced the gender wage gap (Siddiqui, 2007). Vijaya and 
Kaltani (2007) in a study of panel data show that FDI has an adverse impact on overall 
wages in the manufacturing sector and this impact is more pronounced for female wages.  
 
The diverse empirical findings on the impact of liberalization on gender wage inequality 
appear a little perplexing in light of the existing theories3. In reality, liberalization is a 
multifaceted phenomenon; it is a policy package, consisting most importantly of 
reduction in tariff rates accompanied by freer flow of foreign capital. Both these policies 
are likely to have concurrent effects on gender wage gap. But most of the empirical 
studies have emphasized on policies like increased foreign trade and export orientation, 
while only very few studies have dealt with effects of foreign capital inflow4. Moreover, 
it is also necessary to study the effects of the policies on the overall welfare of the 
country along with gender wage gap, since elimination of gender based wage inequality 
cannot be aimed at in isolation. A proper evaluation of a particular policy can be done 
only when gendered considerations are made alongwith its overall welfare effect on the 
society. However, there has been little effort to theoretically examine the effects of both 
tariff reduction and foreign capital inflow on gender wage gap and welfare of the 
economy. 
  
                                                 
3
 The widening wage gap in some countries mainly due to fall in female wage is often attributed 
to the informalisation of labour and lowering of women’s bargaining power (Seguino 2002; Carr, 
Chen and Tate 2000; Balakrishnan 2002). Since women concentrate in labour-intensive 
manufacturing firms and services, their relative bargaining power does not rise even as labour 
demand increases due to globalisation, due to the potential threat of relocation of firms to lower 
wage sites. In contrast, men working mainly in nontradables and capital-intensive industries have 
more bargaining power to demand higher wages. Secondly, there has been a shift of a large 
number of formal sector jobs in female dominated labour-intensive industries, to informal 
employment arrangements, like subcontracting or home worker arrangements, where women earn 
much less than in formal sector jobs. 
 
4
 Studies by Oostendorp (2004); Siegmann (2006); Braunstein and Brenner (2007) have 
emphasized on the impact of FDI. 
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The developing countries are characterized by two pertinent features: gendered inequality 
in access to education and health facilities, and differences in the spending patterns of 
men and women, both having significant implications on their relative efficiency or 
productivity. With widespread poverty in these countries it often becomes difficult to 
meet the direct costs of schooling, so that if a choice has to be made between sending a 
boy or a girl to school, the boy gets preference. Moreover, girls are more likely to have to 
work in the home, care for siblings etc. so that their opportunity cost is higher than that of 
boys (Herz and Sperling 2004). Lack of proper facilities and negligence to women often 
leads to their ill-health, low nutritional level and life expectancy (Sharma 2007; Sen and 
Östlin 2007). On the other hand, in these countries, the ‘consumption efficiency 
hypothesis’ (Leibenstein 1957; Bliss and Stern 1978) is of particular relevance. The 
hypothesis proposes that the nutritional efficiency of a worker is positively related to his 
consumption level at least up to a certain point. If there is a stable relationship between 
the consumption level of the worker and his wage income then the worker’s productivity 
is positively linked to the wage that he receives. However, an increase in wage affects 
men and women differently due to differences in their spending patterns. Women are 
more likely than men to spend a significantly higher proportion of their income on 
purchase of goods and services that promote the nutrition, health, and general well being 
of their families (Duncan 1997; Quisumbing et al. 1998; Kurz and Welch 2000). Men 
tend to spend most of their income on non-food items and their personal luxury articles 
like alcohol and cigarettes or reinvest it in their work or businesses (Guyer 1988; 
Hoddinott and Haddad 1995; Anderson and Baland 2002). Hence an increase in female 
wage is likely to raise the nutritional standard and efficiency of both men and women in a 
family vis-à-vis male wages.  Since liberalisation policies affect labour allocation and 
wages of men and women, it in turn can have different impact on their efficiencies, 
inducing further labour reallocation and change in wages. But this aspect has not been 
dealt in the literature earlier. 
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The present paper purports to analyze the effects of liberalized economic policies5 like 
tariff cut6 and foreign capital inflow on the gender based wage gap and welfare of an 
economy in a 3-sector general equilibrium model appropriate particularly for the female 
labour oriented export led developing countries of South Asia. It is assumed that the 
efficiency functions of male and female workers are different due to two reasons: first, 
gendered differences in spending patterns, with differential effects of male and female 
wages on their nutrition and secondly, social institutions and supply side constraints 
resulting in less availability of education and health facilities to women vis-à-vis men. 
Economic liberalization affects both male and female wages and their efficiencies, while 
change in public provision of social services directly affects the efficiencies of men and 
women, but in dissimilar ways. These in turn, alter the number of male and female 
workers in efficiency units and result in reallocation of factors of production among 
sectors using them with different intensities (in accordance with Rybczynski theorem) 
and changes in relative factor prices. The comparative static results show that tariff 
reforms alongwith increase in public provision of social services may be instrumental in 
lowering gender wage inequality but may have detrimental effects on the welfare of the 
economy. On the other hand, foreign capital inflow both into the export and import-
competing sectors may accentuate wage inequality, but also raise the welfare of the 
economy. These results can explain the empirical evidence of dissimilar effects of 
economic reforms on gender wage inequality in diverse countries as they have 
                                                 
5
 Liberalized economic policies are designed to remove all the impediments to free trade, which 
is the optimal policy for a small open economy. The liberalized investment policy in the form of 
an FDI into the export sector(s) may be an instrument that can lead to export-led growth and raise 
the output of the export sector. On the other hand, contrary to the famous Brecher and Alejandro 
(1977) proposition that suggests an inflow of foreign capital into the import-competing sector 
under certain conditions might lead to import substitution and lower the country’s welfare, there 
are works like Marjit and Beladi (1996), Chaudhuri (2005, 2007), Marjit, Broll and Mitra (1997), 
Chaudhuri et al. (2006) which have shown that welfare may improve also in this case. In the 
present paper also we get the same result. Finally, a tariff cut leads to increase in import 
competition.  
 
6
 Although many of the export-led countries like the East Asian Newly Industrialized Countries 
(NICs) maintained substantial tariff protections, countries like India (Reilly and Dutta 2005), 
Bangladesh (Hoque 2009), Pakistan (Khan, 1999) with female oriented export industries have 
undertaken substantial tariff reduction. 
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undertaken each of the economic liberalization policies at different pace and magnitude. 
These also indicate that there exists a trade-off between reduction in gender wage gap and 
improvement in national welfare.  
 
2.  The model 
 
We consider a small open full-employment economy consisting of three sectors. Sector 1 
produces an agricultural commodity, 1X , using male labour ( M ), female labour ( F ) and 
capital of type 1 ( 1K ). Sector 2 uses female labour and capital of type 1 to produce a 
manufacturing product, 2X .⁯
7
 Sector 3 produces a manufacturing product, 3X , using 
male labour and capital of type 2 ( 2K ). It is assumed that sectors 1 and 2 are the export 
sectors; while sector 1 is the primary good exporting sector, sector 2 may be identified as 
the female labour oriented export-processing zone. Sector 3 is the tariff-protected import-
competing sector. Male labour is mobile between sectors 1 and 3 while female labour is 
employed in sectors 1 and 2. Capital of type 1 is mobile between the two export sectors 
while capital of type 2 is specific8 to sector 3. All the factors of production are fully 
utilized.9 The male and female workers earn wages MW  and FW , respectively, with 
M FW W> , so that there exists a gap between male and female labour wages
10
. Due to the 
                                                 
7
 Some examples of industries intensive in female labour are: garments, tea, tobacco, food-
processing.  
 
8
 Here 1K  requires less skill than 2K , and therefore, can fairly be assumed to be used 
simultaneously in the agricultural and export manufacturing sectors. 
 
9
 In reality, a developing economy is plagued by the existence of involuntary unemployment of 
both male and female labour due to the presence of factor market distortions. As our focus in this 
paper is on gender wage inequality and not on unemployment, we have ignored factor market 
distortions and unemployment of labour. The production structure of our economy is a three-
sector analogue (or a 3×4 specific factor extension) of the classic 2×3 specific factor full-
employment general equilibrium model as developed by Jones (1971). As the return to each 
mobile factor is the same in the two sectors in which it is employed, there occurs full-
employment of all the mobile factors in the different sectors of the economy.  
 
10
 The male female wage gap exists in agriculture as well. For example, in India, the wage rates 
paid to women workers in the agricultural sector are at least 20 to 30 per cent lower than those 
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assumption of a small economy, all the product prices are internationally given. 
Production functions exhibit constant returns to scale with diminishing marginal 
productivity to each factor. Commodity 1 is assumed to be the numeraire. 
  
The following symbols will be used in the formal presentation of the model. 
Kia = capital-output ratio in the i  th sector, i = 1, 2, 3; Mia = male labour-output ratio in 
the i  th sector, i = 1, 3; Fia = female labour-output ratio in the i  th sector, i = 1, 2; iP = 
world price of the i  th good, i  = 1, 2, 3; H = efficiency of the representative male 
worker; h  = efficiency of the representative female worker; FW = wage rate of female 
labour (per efficiency unit); MW = wage rate of male labour (per efficiency unit); R = 
return to capital of type 1; r = return to capital of type 2; t = ad-valorem tariff rate; iX = 
output level of the i  th sector, i  = 1, 2, 3; M  = male population; F  = female 
population; DiK = amount of domestic capital stock of i th type, 1,2i = ; FiK =  amount of 
foreign capital stock of i th type, 1,2i = ; 1K  = aggregate capital stock of type 1 of the 
economy (domestic plus foreign); 2K  = aggregate capital stock of type 2 of the economy 
(domestic plus foreign); E = public spending on social sector; jiθ = distributive share of 
the j  th input in the i th sector, i  =1, 2, 3; j = M , F , K ; jiλ = proportion of the j th input 
employed in the i  th sector, i  =1, 2, 3; j = M , F , K ; ijkS = the degree of substitution 
between factors j  and k  in the i th sector, 1,2i = ,3; ^ = proportionate change, for 
example, 1 1 1ˆ ( / )X dX X= .  
 
The general equilibrium is represented by the following set of equations. 
1 1 1 1M M F F KW a W a Ra+ + =         (1) 
2 2 2F F KW a Ra P+ =   (2) 
3 3 3(1 )M M KW a ra P t+ = +   (3) 
                                                                                                                                                 
paid to men for the same activity. In non-agricultural activities, the difference is even more 
pronounced, with women being paid less than half the wages given to their male counterparts 
(Ramachandran 2006). 
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Equations (1)–(3) are the competitive industry equilibrium conditions in the three sectors.  
Sectors 1 and 2 together can effectively be regarded as a Modified Hechscher-Ohlin 
subsystem (MHOSS). The modification is due to the fact that apart from two common 
inputs, capital of type 1 and female labour, sector 1 also uses male labour as input. We 
now make assumptions on relative factor intensities that we will use throughout the 
analysis. As sector 2 is the female labour oriented export-processing zone we assume that 
sector 2 is female labour-intensive vis-à-vis sector 1 with respect to capital (of type 1) in 
both value and physical sense. These, respectively, suggest that 
2 1 1 2F K F Kθ θ θ θ> and 2 1 1 2F K F Kλ λ λ λ> . It is also assumed that the male labour intensity in 
sector 1 is not less than the female labour intensity in sector 2 with respect to capital in 
value terms, which in turn implies that 1 2 2 1( )M K F Kθ θ θ θ≥ . Besides, for the sake of 
analytical simplicity we also consider that the capital-output ratio in sector 1 ( 1Ka ) is 
constant11. 
 
Complete utilization of capital of types 1 and 2 can be expressed, respectively, as: 
1 1 2 2 1 1 1K K D Fa X a X K K K+ = + =   (4) 
3 3 2 2 2K D Fa X K K K= + =   (5) 
Capital of either type includes both domestic capital and foreign capital. Domestic capital 
and foreign capital of each type are perfect substitutes. Incomes from foreign capital are 
completely repatriated. 
 
                                                 
11
 Although this is a simplifying assumption it is not completely without any basis. Agriculture 
requires inputs like fertilizers, pesticides, weedicides etc., which are to be used in recommended 
doses. Now if capital of type 1 is used to purchase those inputs, the capital (of type 1)-output 
ratio, 1,Ka becomes constant technologically. However, male labour and female labour are 
substitutes and the production function displays the property of constant returns to scale in these 
two inputs. However, even if the capital (of type 1)-output ratio is not given technologically the 
results of the paper still hold under alternative sufficient conditions incorporating the partial 
elasticities of substitution between capital of type 1 and the two types of labour used in sector 1. 
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The efficiency of each type of worker (male and female) is assumed to depend positively 
on wages and the workers’ access to education and health facilities.12 However, the 
efficiency functions of male and female labour are different. The efficiency function of a 
representative male worker is given by 
( , ( ))M FH H E W W= + ; 1 2, 0H H >    (6) 
 
Here E  denotes the public spending on social sector like education and health, which is 
financed by a portion of the tariff revenue earned by the government from the import of 
commodity 3. It may include education subsidy and expenditure on provision and 
extension of health facilities. Since both higher education and better health are pivotal in 
raising the efficiency of a worker, an increase in E  raises the efficiency of a worker.  
 
The efficiency of a worker also depends on the family income depicted by ( )M FW W+ , 
considering that each family consists of a couple13. This is because higher income 
enhances women’s decision-making power within households with substantial effects on 
what items are to be bought, and how it is to be distributed among household members, 
with important implications for welfare of all family members. In the countries for which 
information is available, women’s income has beneficial effect on household calorie 
consumption (von Braun and Kennedy 1994). Therefore, a hike in wages of women leads 
to higher consumption and efficiency of men as well. 
 
                                                 
12
 It may be noted that in accordance with the ‘consumption efficiency hypothesis’ as outlined 
earlier, nutritional efficiencies of the workers actually depend on quantities of commodities 
consumed by them, which is represented by their wages. However, quantities of consumption 
must depend on commodity prices, which in turn suggest that commodity prices should figure in 
the efficiency functions. But since we consider a small open economy where the prices of all 
traded commodities are internationally given, the inclusion or exclusion of commodity prices into 
the efficiency functions does not, in fact, make any difference.  
 
13
 The model implicitly considers both the cases of male/female households and extended 
households, which are quite common in developing countries. In case of the latter, empirical 
results show that household consumption is strongly correlated with their own income, even after 
extended households’ pooled income is controlled for (Altonji et al. 1992; Park 2001). However, 
we do not consider the single-parent household case.  
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Therefore, in equation (6), 1 ( / ) 0H H E= ∂ ∂ >  and 2 ( / (( )) 0M FH H W W= ∂ ∂ + >  denote 
the responsiveness of the efficiency of male workers to changes in public spending on 
social sector and changes in family income respectively. 
 
On the other hand, apart from an increase in public provision of social services, the 
efficiency of women workers also depend on the female wage rate. Most of the evidence 
shows that women working in export-oriented industries retain some control over their 
earnings (Kabeer 2000; Kusago and Barham 2001) and the effect of women’s income is 
also beneficial to their own dietary intake (Bisgrove and Popkin 1996). Therefore with an 
increase in their wages, their consumption and efficiency is likely to increase. However, 
male wages are not likely to have any significant impact since men tend to spend most of 
their income on non-food items and their personal luxury articles, so that any change in 
their wage does not affect the nutrition and efficiency of women in the particular 
household.14  
Hence, the efficiency of a representative female worker can be expressed as 
 
( , )Fh h E W= ; 1 2, 0h h > ;  (7) 
In equation (7), 1 ( / )h h E= ∂ ∂ and 2 ( / )Fh H W= ∂ ∂  are the responsiveness of the 
efficiency of female workers to changes in public spending on social sector and changes 
in female wage. 
 
However, due to social discrimination based on gender, women have access only to a 
portion of the public spending on social sector. Consequently, the effective impact of any 
change in public spending on social sector on the efficiency of a female worker is less 
than that of a male worker. Hence, we assume that 1 1H h> . 
                                                 
14
 It is empirically observed that men also contribute to the family although their contribution is 
far less than that of the women. There can be two extreme cases: (i) men do not contribute at all 
to family income; and (ii) they contribute their whole income to family income. For the sake of 
analytical simplicity, we have considered the first extreme case. The algebra of the model 
becomes extremely complicated if we consider the intermediate case. It may, however, be 
checked intuitively that even if we assume that men do contribute to family income but at a 
significantly lower rate than women, the qualitative results of our paper are retained.  
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The endowments of male and female labour in efficiency units are given by the 
following: 
1 1 3 3 ( , )M M M Fa X a X MH E W W+ = +   (8) 
1 1 2 2 ( , )F F Fa X a X Fh E W+ =   (9) 
Here M  and F  denote the male and female population respectively. 
 
There are nine endogenous variables, 1 2 3, , , , , ,M FW W R r X X X H and h  that can be solved 
from the above nine equations. The policy parameters of the system are, 1 2, ,K K t .and E . 
This is an indecomposable system, where the factor prices cannot be solved from the 
price system alone. Therefore, any change in the factor endowments affect factor prices, 
which in turn, affect the per unit input requirements, ija s  in each sector. 
 
The demand side of the model is represented by a quasi-concave social utility function. 
Let U denote the social utility that depends on the consumption demands for the three 
commodities denoted by, 1D , 2D and 3D . Thus, it is shown as 
),,( 321 DDDUU =                  .                               (10) 
 
Now the aggregate demands for the three commodities are given by the following three 
equations. 
1 1 1 2 3( , , (1 ), )
             (-) (+)    (+)     (+) 
D D P P P t Y= +
         (11.1) 
2 2 1 2 3( , , (1 ), )
             (+) (-)    (+)     (+) 
D D P P P t Y= +
        (11.2) 
and,         
3 3 1 2 3( , , (1 ), )
             (+) (+)    (-)     (+) 
D D P P P t Y= +
        (11.3) 
where Y is the national income at domestic prices. All commodities are normal goods 
with negative and positive own price and income elasticities of demand, respectively. The 
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cross-price elasticities are positive. So, we have (( / )( / )) 0;iPi i i i iE D P P D= ∂ ∂ <  
(( / )( / )) 0iY i iE D Y Y D= ∂ ∂ >  for 1,2,3i = ; and, (( / )( / )) 0iPk i Pk Pk iE D P P D= ∂ ∂ > for i k≠ .  
The foreign capital incomes of both types are fully repatriated. The balance of trade 
equilibrium requires that 
1 1 2 2 3 3 1 1 2 2 3 3 1 2F FPD P D P D P X P X P X RK rK E+ + = + + − − − ,    (12)  
or equivalently, 
1 1 2 2 3 3 1 1 2 2 3 3 1 2 3* * ( )F FPD P D P D P X P X P X RK rK tP M E+ + = + + − − + −   (12.1)                                          
 
The volume of import is given by the following equation. 
3 1 2 3 3( , , (1 ), )M D P P P t Y X= + −                                                                                     (13) 
 
The national income of the economy at domestic prices is given by 
1 1 2 2 3 3 3 1 2(1 ) ( ) F FY P X P X P t X tP M E RK rK= + + + + − − −     (14)                                                                             
or equivalently, 
1 2 3(.) (.) ( )M F D DY W MH W Fh RK rK tP M E= + + + + −     (14.1)                                 
 
In equation (14.1), (.)MW MH  and (.)FW Fh are the total wage incomes earned by male 
and female workers respectively. 1DRK  and 2DrK  are the domestic rental incomes from 
two types of capital. E  is the amount of government spending on health and education 
which is financed by a portion of the tariff revenue, MtP3 , earned by the government 
from import of commodity 3. Finally, 3( )tP M E−  is the excess tariff revenue (net of the 
government spending), which is handed over to the consumers in a lump-sum manner.  
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3.  Effects of economic liberalization and government policies on gender wage 
inequality 
 
In this section, we analyse (i) the effects of trade liberalization like reduction in import 
tariff and foreign capital inflow of both types; and, (ii) government policies like higher 
public provision of social services, on the gender wage inequality.15  
 
It has been assumed that MW  and FW  represent the wage rates of male and female 
workers per efficiency units respectively. Now, an increase in any of the parameters is 
likely to affect the efficiencies of both types of workers per capita. Since wage inequality 
generally refers to difference in per capita wage per unit of time, the appropriate measure 
of wage inequality between male and female workers is  
( )I M FW W H W h= −   (15) 
 
From (15) it is evident that the change in male-female wage inequality must depend on 
changes in their wages, MW  and FW , and also on their efficiencies, H and h .⁯
16
 
  
3.1 Effects of tariff cut 
 
To examine the effects of reduction in the tariff rate on gender wage inequality, it is 
assumed that ˆ 0t <  while other parameters are constant. The effect on gender wage 
inequality is obtained as  
 
 
 
                                                 
15
 The mathematical derivations of the comparative static results can be obtained from the 
authors on request. 
 
16
 Labour productivity improvements (via increased social spending) result only in declines in 
wages since the country is a price taker.   
 15 
2 3
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 3 3 2 1 2
ˆ ˆ( / ( ) )[( )( ) ( 1)][
                       (+)                (+)                      (-)                  (+)        (+)
I I K F F K F K K F M MK M M F M KW W Tt S W H Wθ λ λ λ λ θ θ θ θ λ θ θ θ= ∆ − − +
 
                      
2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2( )( ) ( ) ]
                                      (-)
M M F K F K F F M KW H W H W h W hθ θ θ θ θ θ− + − − +
 (16)           
  
It follows from (16) that ˆ 0IW <  when ˆ 0t <  under the sufficient conditions:  
(i) 0∆ <  and                                                          (17) 
(ii) 2 2( )M FW H h W h≥ +  
 
This leads to the following proposition.   
Proposition 1: A reduction in tariff may improve the gender wage inequality. 
 
The economic explanation may be given as follows. The lowering of tariff rate reduces 
the domestic price of the output in sector 3 leading to contraction of the sector. So 3X  
falls. The input demands for both male labour and capital of type 2 fall leading to 
decreases in their prices, MW  and r . Now as MW  falls the effective price of commodity 1 
rises due to saving on cost of male labour. This produces a Stolper-Samuelson effect in 
the MHOSS. The return to capital of type 1 ( R ) rises and the female wage ( FW ) falls as 
sector 1 is more (less) capital (female labour) intensive than sector 2. So both MW  and 
FW  plummet, which in turn lower both the efficiency of each male worker ( H ) and that 
of female worker ( h ) but at different rates as the forms of their efficiency functions 
(equation (6) and equation (7)) are different. Therefore, the direction of change in gender 
wage inequality must depend on rates of change in MW , FW , H  and h . Our analysis 
suggests that the wage inequality improves following a tariff cut under the sufficient 
conditions as presented in (17).  
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3.2 Effects of foreign capital inflow 
  
Let us assume that foreign capital of type 1 flows in. This implies that 1ˆ 0K >  with all 
other parameters remaining unchanged. The effect on gender wage inequality is obtained 
as  
1 1 2 3 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 1
ˆ ˆ( / ) [ ( )( )
                       (-)                                                               (+)               (-)                 
I I M F K M F M K M M F K F KW W K W H W W H W Hθ λ λ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ= ∆ − + −
 
                                                                 
2 1 2( ) ]
              (+)
F F M KW h W h θ θ− +
   (18)   
It follows from (18) that ˆ 0IW >  when 1ˆ 0K >  if condition (17) holds.  
 
Now, let us consider the case when foreign capital of type 2 flows in. This implies that 
2
ˆ 0K >  with other parameters remaining unaltered. The resulting wage inequality is given 
as  
2 3 3 1 2 2 1 2 1 2
ˆ ˆ( / ( )) ( )[
                         (-)                        (+)  
I I M K K F K F M F M KW W K W H Wθ λ θ λ λ λ λ θ θ= ∆ −
 
            
2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2( )( ) ( ) ]
                  (+)                (-)                           (+)
M M F K F K F F M KW H W H W h W hθ θ θ θ θ θ− + − − +
   (19) 
It follows from (19) that ˆ 0IW >  when 2ˆ 0K >  if condition (17) holds. 
 
These results lead to the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2: Foreign capital inflow of either type may aggravate gender based wage 
differential.   
 
An inflow of foreign capital of type 1 lowers its return, R . For satisfying the zero-profit 
condition in sector 2, FW  must rise. Also a Rybczynski effect takes place in the MHOSS. 
Sector 1 expands while sector 2 contracts, as the former is more capital-intensive vis-à-
vis the latter with respect to female labour.  The input demands for both types of labour 
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increase in sector 1 leading to increases in both MW  and FW . The additional female 
labour in sector 1 comes from the contracting sector 2 while male labour must come from 
sector 3. Consequently, sector 3 contracts. Now, owing to increases in MW  and FW , the 
efficiencies of both male and female workers augment, but in different magnitudes due to 
differences in spending patterns.  The increase in per capita wage for female workers is 
lower than that for the male workers, increasing the wage gap under the sufficient 
conditions (17).  
 
On the other hand, an inflow of foreign capital of type 2 in the import-competing sector 
lowers the return to capital, r . Sector 3 must expand as this type of capital is specific to 
this sector. Accordingly the demand for male labour rises which in turn raises MW . 
Additional male labour must come from sector 1 leading to its contraction. The 
contracting sector 1 releases both capital of type 1 and female labour to sector 2, which in 
turn expands. However, the increase in the demand for female labour in sector 2 is 
greater than the release of female labour by sector 1. This leads to an increase in the 
female wage, FW . We may provide an alternative explanation as to why sector 1 (sector 
2) contracts (expands) and FW  rises. As MW  rises, the effective price of commodity 1, 
net of cost on male labour, falls. This produces a Stolper-Samuelson type effect in the 
MHOSS resulting in a decrease in R and an increase in FW  as sector 1 (sector 2) is capital 
(female labour) intensive. This then leads to a Rybczynski type effect.17 As a result of 
increases in wages (per efficiency units), the efficiencies of both male and female labour 
( H and h ) rise. But the increase in H  is greater than that in h  because of the reasons 
discussed earlier. The per capita wage inequality rises under the given sufficient 
conditions. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17
 A Stolper-Samuelson effect is followed by a Rybczynski type effect if the production functions 
are of variable coefficient type. 
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3.3 Effects of increased public provision of education and health 
 
Now we examine the effects of an increase in the public spending on social services, i.e. 
ˆ 0E > . The gender wage inequality is obtained as  
 
3 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
ˆ ˆ( / ( )) [{ ( ) (1 )}[
                         (-)                            (-)                          (+)   
I I K K F K F M K M F M KW W EE H h W H Wθ θ λ λ λ λ λ λ α θ θ= ∆ − − +
 
          
2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2( )( ) ( ) ]
                  (+)               (-)                           (+)
M M F K F K F F M KW H W H W h W hθ θ θ θ θ θ− + − − +
  (20) 
 
It follows from (20) that ˆ 0IW <  when ˆ 0E >  if condition (17) holds. 
 
These results lead to the following proposition. 
Proposition 3: An increase in the public spending on social services may improve the 
gender wage inequality.  
 
A boost in E  augments the efficiencies and therefore endowments of both male and 
female labour (in efficiency units), the latter being lesser due to skewed access to social 
services ( 1 1H h> ). Both MW  and FW  fall as the supply of both types of labour (in 
efficiency units) increase given their demands. As MW  falls, the return to capital of type 2 
i.e. r  rises (see equation (3)) urging the producers to substitute capital by male labour. 
This lowers the capital-output ratio in sector 3 i.e. 3Ka . As 22
3K
KX
a
= (see equation (5)), 
sector 3 expands. Besides, fall in both MW  and FW  in turn generate a second round of 
effect, reducing the efficiencies of both male and female labour. The gap in per capita 
wages improves under the same sufficient conditions.  
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4.  Effects of economic liberalization and government policies on the welfare of the 
economy 
 
The comparative static results on gender wage inequality show that trade liberalization in 
the form of tariff cut and government policies of enhanced social services reduce the 
gender wage gap, while foreign capital inflow of either type enhances it. However, it is 
equally important to ascertain the effect of each policy change on the welfare of the 
economy. Therefore, we now analyze the implications of different policies on the 
welfare, measured by the social welfare function as given by equation (10).⁯18   
 
4.1 Effects of tariff cut  
 
Reduction in tariff rate has both favourable and adverse effects on the national welfare. 
On one hand, both male and female wages reduce (explained in proposition 1), leading to 
decreases in their endowments in efficiency units so that total wage income falls. This 
affects social welfare adversely. On the other hand, the lowering of tariff rate leads to the 
contraction of sector 3 and may result in an increase in tariff revenue following an 
increase in import demand.19 Hence the amount of net lump-sum transfer payments to the 
consumers may increase and work favourably on welfare. Besides, as the tariff-distorted 
domestic price of commodity 3 falls, the demand side distortionary effect of tariff is 
reduced and consumers would be consuming more of good 3. However, national welfare 
may worsen if the negative wage effect dominates over the positive tariff revenue effect.  
This leads to the following proposition. 
Proposition 4: Tariff reduction may be welfare deteriorating. 
 
 
 
                                                 
18
 The mathematical derivations of the welfare analysis can be obtained from the authors on 
request. 
 
  
19
 The tariff revenue goes up unless the import demand function is price inelastic.  
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4.2.  Effects of foreign capital inflow 
 
An inflow of 1K , on one hand, leads to increases in both MW  and FW  (explained in 
proposition 2), which in turn augment the efficiencies of both male and female workers 
and their endowments in efficiency units. Therefore the total wage income of male and 
female labour rises. On the other hand, as sector 3 contracts (already explained in 
proposition 2) the tariff revenue rises following a boost in import demand. This in turn 
raises the net transfer payments made to the consumers. Welfare of the economy 
improves as both aggregate wage income and net transfer payments increase.  
 
Analogously, an inflow of foreign capital of type 2 results in hike in MW  and FW  (as 
explained in proposition 2) so that the male and female labour in efficiency units rise and 
their total wage income rises, producing a favourable effect on social welfare. On the 
other hand, as sector 3 expands, import demand falls that lowers the tariff revenue and 
hence the net transfer payments to the consumers. This affects welfare adversely. Thus, 
there are two opposite effects on welfare. The net outcome would be an improvement of 
the society’s welfare if the positive wage effect outweighs the negative tariff revenue 
effect. 
This leads to the following proposition. 
Proposition 5: An inflow of foreign capital of either type may be welfare improving.  
 
4.3 Effects of increased public provision of education and health  
 
An increase in E  raises the efficiencies of both male and female workers, so that given 
their wages, there is a favourable impact on welfare. However, the wages do not remain 
the same. We have seen that both the policies reduce MW  and FW , leading to declines in 
the endowments of both male and female labour in efficiency units (explained in 
proposition 3). The net outcomes on the male and female endowment in efficiency units 
and total wage income depend on the relative strengths of the two opposite effects. 
Besides, as the tariff-protected import-competing sector (sector 3) expands, the demand 
for imports falls. The consequence would be a decline in the tariff revenue. The net lump-
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sum transfer payments made to consumers also plummets. Social welfare worsens if the 
aggregate wage effect is either negative or not sufficiently positive to dominate over the 
negative tariff revenue effect. So the following proposition can now be established. 
Proposition 6: Increased public provision of social services may have detrimental 
consequences on the welfare of the economy.  
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
 
In the recent decades, an increasing number of countries have been embarking on the 
trajectory of economic liberalization. To acquire the greatest and inclusive benefits of 
liberalization, it is widely argued that gender dimensions should be mainstreamed into 
development and trade strategies. With the wide persistence of gender based wage 
differential in the developing countries, it therefore becomes imperative to examine the 
effects of different liberalization policies on the wage gap. In this paper, we develop a 3-
sector general equilibrium model to study the effects of tariff cut and foreign capital 
inflow on the gender wage gap and welfare of the economy. It is assumed that the 
efficiency functions of male and female workers are different due to (i) skewed access to 
education and health, and (ii) differences in their spending patterns and effects of wages 
on nutrition. In this scenario, it is found that tariff cut may reduce the gender wage 
inequality, but may also have adverse effects on welfare.  On the other hand, inflow of 
foreign capital both into export as well as import sectors may aggravate male-female 
wage inequality. Nonetheless, it may have favourable consequences on the welfare of the 
economy. However, although increased provision of social services leads to diminution 
of wage inequality, it may have detrimental effects on welfare. Therefore, when tariff cut 
and investment liberalization policies are undertaken concomitantly, the impact on 
gender wage gap may differ among countries depending on the magnitude and strength of 
each policy. The paper on one hand, provides a theoretical explanation behind diverse 
empirical findings on gender wage inequality due to economic liberalization in 
developing countries; on the other, it shows that there exists a trade off between gender 
wage inequality and welfare of the economy.  
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